fully exploit.
In short, impediments to self-evaluation operate on a national as well as organizational scale.
Public policy analysis seldom reaches the standards achieved in the professions and natural sciences because policy evaluation is crushed, deterred, or coopted. As a result policy debate often assumes an inane character. Key hypotheses and assumptions are unspecified and untested, and facts are assumed without proof. Charlatans who purvey disinformation on behalf of special interests often have the loudest voice and the last word. Thus Ernst Cassirer once noted the "deep chasm" between the customs of scientific and political inquiry: 16 When it comes to political action man seems to follow rules quite different from those recognized in all his mere theoretical activities. No one would think of solving a problem of natural science or a technical problem by the methods that are recommended and put into action in the solution of political questions. In the first case we never aim to use anything but rational methods. ... But in man's practical and social life the defeat of rational thought seems to be complete and irrevocable.
In politics, Cassirer notes, "modern man is supposed to forget everything he has learned in the development of his intellectual life. He is admonished to go back to the first rudimentary stages of human culture." In political dialogue "rational and scientific thought openly confess their breakdown." 17 Evaluation is weak because social knowledge affects the distribution of social and political power. Hence the creation of social knowledge is politicized. Elites suppress evaluation because it often threatens their social or political positions. Society needs evaluation to formulate effective state policies but smothers it to protect the social and political order from challenge.
Thus in 1939 the American sociologist Robert Lynd wrote: 18 A world foundering disastrously because of its inability to make its institutions work is asking the social sciences: "What do you know? What do you propose?" And, unfortunately for the peace of mind of the social scientist, these questions are not asked with complete dispassion; not infrequently they are loaded in the sense of, "Tell us what we want to hear, or else--!" ... The social scientist finds himself caught, therefore, between the rival demands for straight, incisive, and, if need be, radically divergent thinking, and the growingly insistent demand that his thinking shall not be subversive.
... [The university professor] lives in a world which, by and large, is not asking, "Is Smith trying to get at the facts? Is he trying to be fair and constructive at the same time that he is unwilling to pull his punch?" but which asks, "Are you for us, or against us?" Likewise Hans Morgenthau noted that societies destroy those who question the myths that support the power and authority of dominant groups: 19 In all societies certain social problems cannot be investigated at all, or only at grave risk to the investigator. The basic philosophic assumptions by which society lives are beyond scient ific investigation, for to question them is tantamount to questioning the worth of society itself, its justice, its rationality, its very right to exist. ... [Evaluative social science becomes] a political threat to the defenders or the opponents of the status quo or to both; for the social conventions about power, which political science cannot 18 Robert S. Lynd, Knowledge For What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture (Princeton: help subjecting to a critical--and often destructive--examination, are one of the main sources from which the claims to power, and hence power itself, derive.
Evaluation often serves no interest except the general interest. Hence even oppositions and out-groups will not evaluate: instead they, like their opponents, issue self-serving propaganda.
As a result the "free marketplace of ideas" often creates a confusion-sowing competition among charlatans that generates more darkness than light. Thus Marxist critics of capitalist foreign policies crafted their criticism less to explain reality than to strengthen the case for socialist rule.
For example, in their studies of imperialism V.I. Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg endorsed the false economic notions of nineteenth-century American and European imperialists because this helped them argue that capitalism fostered imperialism, hence was warlike, and so was inferior to socialism. 20 Their writings were less "evaluation" than self-serving propaganda, crafted to advance socialist claims to power. Finding truth was a secondary concern.
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In sum, states misperceive partly because national evaluative machinery is weak or defective, evaluation meets powerful resistance, and it often profits no one capable of doing it.
As a result state decisions are often taken without serious analysis, on the basis of simplistic analogies or misinformation. Careful assessment of key ideas is never done.
Non-evaluation is a permissive condition that allows militaristic and nationalistic myths to 21 Another criticism of the "free marketplace of ideas" is Benjamin Ginsberg, The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power (New York: Basic Books, 1986). Ginsberg argues, similarly to the main argument of this chapter, that the ideas "free market" in fact resembles a monopoly because unduly optimistic about the possibility of government learning because it omits the problem of non-evaluation. Non-evaluation is a powerful retardant to government learning and a powerful cause of government forgetting. It makes states inherently prone to overlook what they once knew; to accept and to act on false and even silly premises; and hence to make policy blunders.
It would be good if governments could create and conserve knowledge. But evaluation is a prime engine of learning--perhaps a prerequisite for learning--and governments are reflexively hostile to evaluation. Hence government learning is almost an oxymoron. Governments can learn, but only poorly and unreliably, and they often forget at an even faster rate.
IV. TACTICS USED AGAINST EVALUATION
intellectual resources are heavily skewed, leaving some groups as producers and others as captive consumers of ideas. 22 On diversionary war see Jack S. Foreign Minister T∩g∩ Shigenori later remarked that "I was astonished at our lack of statistical data," and noted the "absurdity of our having to base our deliberations on assumptions, since the high command refused to divulge figures on the numbers of our forces, or any facts relating to operations." Ibid. 50 Ienaga, Pacific War: 39.
a bad light from its declassified documents series.
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Targets of evaluation also starve it of information by concealing their aims and strategies;
this leaves evaluators with no target to assess. Thus in August 1914 the German government issued a formal ban on any publication discussing German war aims or peace terms in other than vague and general terms. 53 Those concerned about German policy had no policy to judge.
Opponents of evaluation can disrupt it by proliferating competing pseudo-evaluations.
Governments and private interests operate internal propaganda organs and fund friendly external think tanks that publish congenial policy analysis. These institutions clog the debate with disinformation and sow confusion. Often their analysis ignores contrary analysis instead of answering it, so the public debate becomes a contest of volume. As studies pile up outsiders find it harder to intrude because the amo unt of "literature" to master before one qualifies as an expert becomes unmanageable. Thus Herbert Gans notes how news sources can manipulate the news by "news saturation"--"the proliferation of so much information by the source that some of it cannot help but turn into news, concurrently placing less well organized sources with more accurate information at a disadvantage." human-caused global warming is underway. As a result the U.S. public exaggerates scientific disagreement about the basic facts of the matter. 
V. CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO SELF-EVALUATION
What conditions most conduce to policy evaluation, and which are least conducive?
Prospects for evaluation heavily depend on having a large system of free universities. These universities must be autonomous from the state and be well protected by traditions of academic freedom. They must be so numerous that orthodoxies cannot easily gain hegemony in particular disciplines, but instead will always face challenge from dissenting views. Evaluation will be weak where these conditions are missing--where universities have little autonomy and are few in number. Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union score badly on these dimensions; modern Britain scores better, and the modern United States--with its huge system of highly independent schools--scores very well.
A large system of free universities is not enough by itself, however. Academics must also have an evaluative ethos--a sense that their duties include evaluating important official or popular beliefs. This ethos is often missing: instead many scholars hold policy-relevant studies in disregard while dwelling on esoterica. In its absence a large university system can become a self-contained community in which academics serve as markets for one anothers' writings and ideas. If this market is large enough academics can forego the need to address the wider society; their internal market sustains them. Large academic community size then operates to inhibit evaluation by giving scholars a guaranteed audience that tolerates irrelevance and obscurantism.
Scholars that seek to avoid addressing reality can retreat by addressing this audience.
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Evaluation is better when publics and elites are socialized to value evaluation. Oppositely, a hyper-patriotic public climate can deter evaluation by conditioning potential audiences to condemn evaluators as unpatriotic. Critics of official mistakes become, in the public mind, opponents of flag and country; this deters such critics to begin with.
The effectiveness of evaluation varies with issue area. Evaluation is best when the expertise required to evaluate the policy or belief is grounded on a well-developed science. It is worst if this expertise is grounded on poorly-developed science. Thus in the United States evaluation has been most effective when policies have turned on hard-science issues--for example, the danger that smoking causes cancer, or that chlorofluorocarbons released into the atmosphere will Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991): 205. 58 Observing this dynamic in the United States is Russell Jacoby, The Last Intellectuals: American destroy the ozone layer. 59 The basic methods of the hard sciences have prove n effective and withstood scrutiny. As a result evaluation grounded in hard science is often done well, and its results are hard to ignore because they rest on proven methods. Evaluation grounded on social science stands on a weaker foundation: social science remains a primitive enterprise, lacking proven methods and cumulative traditions. As a result evaluation grounded in social science is often done poorly, and even when done well it lacks the prestige to persuade others to accept its conclusions.
Evaluation is weaker in issue areas where policymakers have a monopoly of information and expertise. For example, evaluation of national defense and security policy is impeded in all societies by barriers of secrecy and classification. Secrecy shields information from hostile powers, but also inhibits evaluation by analysts inside and outside of government by starving them of data. Domestic policies that turn on widely-available information and expertise are evaluated more effectively.
Evaluation is better when evaluation threatens politically weak interests and protects strong interests. Unfortunately this is rarely the case, especially when important policies are evaluated.
Important policies tend to affect important interests; these interests can mobilize large resources to defeat evaluation. As a result more important policies are often less well-evaluated. Thus
Holger Herwig suggests a perverse law whereby "those events that are most important are hardest to understand because they attract the greatest attention from mythmakers and charlatans."
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Culture in the Age of Academe (New York: Basic Books, 1987): 112-237. 59 Offering examples of successful evaluation in hard-science policy areas is Primack and von Hippel, Advice and Dissent: 128-235. 60 Herwig, "Clio Deceived": 7.
Evaluation is better when evaluators are skilled in political action. Policy evaluation requires academic/scientific ability, but its success depends as well on expertise in political combat and public relations. Evaluative institutions will be subjected to political attack and they must have effective strategies for coping. They must infuse their personnel with an ethos that anticipates and accepts the hardship that these attacks create. They should recognize that the results of evaluation must be publicized effectively; unpublicized studies have no results. This 
VI. EVIDENCE FROM CASES
How common is policy non-self-evaluation? Where does it most thrive, and what conditions produce it? How much national misperception can it explain? Light is shed on these questions by policymaking in Germany, France, Italy, Britain, and the United States in the last century, especially during the two world wars. Wartime is a good venue for study because the stakes of wartime decisions are very high, so evaluation failure cannot be ascribed to the inattention that leaders often give to secondary issues. If we find evaluation failure, therefore, we can infer that a pathology such as nonevaluation--not mere inattention--was at work.
What do we find? Policymaking by the belligerent powers in the two world wars was quite poor despite the gravity of the issues and the high cost of error. The belligerents made large errors without carefully assessing their options. Even rudimentary analysis often would have exposed these errors but was omitted. Governments often later failed to reassess their wartime decisions in search of lessons. Individuals who did evaluate were often attacked and punished for their trouble. And some who might have evaluated--especially academics--sometimes drifted into dreamy irrelevance, studying questions of no importance while central issues were unaddressed. Things were worst in the more authoritarian states (Germany, Japan, and Italy) and best in the United States, but even there things were not satisfactory.
The German foreign policy debate before World War I saw frivolous arguments pass unchallenged to become the basis for policy, while German scholars further poisoned the debate instead of steering it toward solid ground. 61 The German press was filled with articles that glorified war and offered fatuous but unanswered arguments for empire. The public was assured that war was a fine experience--the "noblest and most sacred manifestation of human activity" 62 --and told that "we Teutons" must "no longer look upon war as our destroyer ... at last we must see it once more as the savior, the physician." 63 Expansionists wrongly warned that without colonies serve as markets, fields for investment, and areas for resettlement of German "surplus
In allied countries neither war aims nor military tactics were analyzed carefully. Clear war aims were never specified. 85 Critics of French and British offensive tactics were purged from the army, 86 and scapegoats were blamed for successive failures. still-powerful blunderers.
The myth of the offensive survived the war. In the 1920s many generals still preached the power of the offense, and denied that the defense had actually had the advantage during the war.
In his memoirs Germany's General Ludendorff wrongly claimed: "Of the two [policies], the offensive makes less demands on the men and gives no higher losses. Weimar German scholars made no effort to assess the policies that had led Germany to war and defeat. 100 Instead they parroted the patriotic line--denying German responsibility for the war and repeating the "stab in the back" myth that blamed Germany's defeat on leftists at home.
Conservative German publishers conspired to reinforce these messages, commissioning hundred 95 Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth (London: Oswald Wolff, 1958; reprint ed., Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979): 48, also 9; and Brodie, War and Politics: 11-12.
96 B.H. Liddell Hart, "Foreword," in Ritter, Schlieffen Plan: 3-10 at 3. 97 Ritter, Schlieffen Plan: 4. B.H. Liddell Hart later marvelled: "In light of Schlieffen's papers, and of the lessons of World War I, it is hard to find reason for the way he has so long been regarded as a master mind, and one who would have been victorious if he had lived to conduct his own Plan." "Foreword," in Ritter, Schlieffen Plan: 9. 98 Herwig, "Failure of German Sea Power": 86-94. 99 Edward L. Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe: The Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry, 1919-39 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1976): 55-56. 100 The spirit behind this silence was expressed by the head of Germany's naval archives, who privately explained that "history is not to be written for the purpose of tearing down but for building up. Therefore, with marked failures, much must be done to cover them with love, because history must be constructive." Keith W. Fascist writers claimed that Italy had one of the strongest armies in Europe, and a navy and air force that had reached perfection. They boasted that Italy had "little or nothing to learn" from Germany or anyone else in military matters. 129 In fact at the end of World War II Italy still lacked a real tank, and it produced more aircraft in World War I than World War II. 130 Italy's peak artillery production rate in World War II was less than one-sixth its peak rate in World War I. 131 In the 1930s Fascist propagandists claimed Italy could mobilize a 12 million man army: in fact it mobilized only three million men, who carried rifles designed in 1891. 132 As Denis Mack
Smith concludes, in Fascist Italy "myth-making became the one essential art of government, more important than statesmanship or farsightedness or even effective administration."
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In short, the history of policymaking in the European and Asian belligerent states of the two world wars is a record of recurrent folly. The belligerents repeatedly made blunders that could have been exposed by minimal objective analytic scrutiny, had it been allowed. These blunders were common among the democracies, even more common among the authoritarian states. Thus the realist image of these wars--that they grew from collisions among rational-acting states whose misperceptions reflected the opaqueness of the international environment--is incorrect.
The belligerents misperceived a rather transparent world because they had no functioning analytic apparatus. This occurred because the belligerent governments and societies punished evaluation, often quite savagely.
If so, these cases indicate that non-evaluation is pervasive. Even the large incentive for rational calculation posed by the perils of total war may be unable to overcome it.
Conditions for evaluation have been better in the United States than elsewhere, and the quality of policy evaluation in the U.S. has accordingly been higher than in the belligerent states discussed above. But measured against an absolute standard it leaves much to be desired. The quality of analysis achieved by the professions or the hard sciences is seldom achieved in evaluation of major public policies, especially foreign and security policies. universities that receive Defense Department research funding. 139 Such stories could be multiplied many times.
Finally, evaluative lassitude is pronounced among American scholars, as observers of academe have often remarked. Thus Hans Morgenthau once lamented that American political science is guilty of a general retreat from evaluation. Instead, he noted, it hides in "the trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical, the remotely historical--in short, the politically irrelevant." 140 External hostility would be a badge of achievement for social scie nce--"a political science that is mistreated and persecuted is likely to have earned that enmity because it has put its moral commitment to the truth above social convenience and ambition." 141 Instead political science ducks criticism by producing obscure and irrelevant research. "History and methodology, in particular, become the protective armor which shields political science from contact with ... political reality." Morgenthau observed a "new scholasticism," in academe--the pursuit of an "intellectual exercise, frequently executed with a high degree of acumen and sophistication, that tells us nothing we need to know about the real world." Scholars maintain their reputations by "engaging in activities that can have no relevance for the political problems of the day"; instead they substitute a "fanatical devotion to esoteric terminology and mathematical formulas, equations, and charts, in order to elucidate or obscure the obvious." As a result, in the study of international affairs "prudence and truth are bent to the purposes of power, and ... superstition takes the place of rational knowledge." Social science resembles "a deaf man answering questions which no one has asked him."
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Many others have echoed Morgenthau's criticisms. Russell Jacoby laments the retreat toward irrelevance of American social science, despite the infusion of people with background in social criticism into universities. 143 Jacoby observes that even the New Left intellectuals, now ensconced in the academic world they once opposed, produce writing that is "largely technical, unreadable, and--except by specialists--unread." 144 For them professionalized social science has common, but at some point most were recognized and reversed. Thus the U.S. erred by being disengaged from Europe before World Wars I and II, but it reversed the error by joining those wars and by later organizing NATO and deploying troops to Europe during the Cold War. The U.S. erred by attempting to conquer North Korea during the Korean war but it abandoned this goal after China intervened in the war. The U.S. blundered into Vietnam but eventually cut its losses and accepted failure. This record contrasts sharply with the relentless pursuit of error by Germany, Japan and Italy earlier in this century. Once set on a course of folly these powers usually stayed firmly on it. They learned little or nothing from their successive failures. Only total defeat could set the state on a new course.
VII. CONCLUSION
Inquiry about politics is harder inquiry in the natural sciences because the investigator must overcome both the question and an established order that often fears the answer. As a result, state policies are often adopted on the basis of less careful analysis than their importance warrants, leaving wide room for mistakes and misperceptions. Forces of knowledge destruction are often stronger than those favoring knowledge creation. Hence states have an inherent tendency toward primitive thought, and the conduct of public affairs is often polluted by myth, misinformation, and flimsy analysis.
A major risk of war lies in the tendency of policymakers to underestimate this phenomenon and assume instead that states are intelligent actors. Policymakers are safer to assume that both their own state and their adversaries are prone to folly and to buffer their policies against this fact. They should rarely adopt policies that demand a large measure of sophistication and subtlety because such policies will often exceed their own state's analytic capacity. Adversaries should be assumed to be slow to learn, blunder-prone, and hard to deter. Ill-considered actions by adversaries should be anticipated. Nonevaluation injects folly into the warp and woof of international politics; policymakers should accept this reality and plan accordingly.
Nonevaluation has been noticed before but explained in psychological terms. For example,
Irving Janis has argued that the psychology of small-group dynamics, which he labels "groupthink," causes decision-makers to abandon their independence of mind and conform to the dominant view in the group. As a result the dominant view is never carefully examined even if it is woefully flawed. 155 Martha Wolfenstein, addressing another piece of the problem, argues that people who warn of disaster face hostility, even if they are proven right, because those who suffer the disaster interpret it as personal punishment and interpret warnings as threats of punishment. 156 Hence we see the "kill the messenger" syndrome--those who bring useful bad news are punished for it.
Nonevaluation theory differently argues that groupthink dynamics reflect the simple tendency of people, for rational self-serving reasons, to make life hard on those who criticize their performance. Evaluators understand this tendency and are deterred by it--they silence themselves from fear of retribution. And nonevalua tion theory explains the kill the messenger syndrome as occurring because warnings of disaster threaten the reputation of leaders or officials who allowed the danger to arise, and may threaten other government incumbents by raising the need to address the disaster by innovation, with its attendant possibility of personnel shakeups.
In this view the working out of self-interest in the context of bureaucratic power-politics, not
